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GENDER EQUITY IN ATHLETICS:




No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any education program or ac-
tivity receiving Federal financial assistance ....
I. INTRODUCTION
Until now, Title IX has had its most profound impact on inter-
collegiate athletics. Cases abound2 and the literature is abundant.3
Title IX has served as an effective statutory remedy for sex-based
classifications in intercollegiate sports. By most accounts, Title IX
has already vastly increased the athletic opportunities available for
* Ray Yasser is a Professor of Law at the University of Tulsa College of Law. He has
published extensively in the field of sports law, and is coauthor of the nation's most widely
used sports law textbook.
** Sam Schiller is a University of Tulsa College of Law graduate and maintains a general
law practice in Haskell, Oklahoma.
1 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (a) (1994) (commonly referred to as "Title IX").
2 For some of the more widely cited intercollegiate cases, see Cohen v. Brown Univ.,
991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993); Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pennsylvania, 7 F.3d 332 (3d Cir.
1993); Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir. 1993). For discus-
sion of these cases, see infra part II.C.
3 See, e.g., Philip Anderson, A Football School's Guide to Title IX Compliance, 2 SPORTS L.J.
75 (1995); B. Glenn George, Miles to Go and Promises to Keep: A Case Study in Title IX 64 U.
COLO. L. REv. 555 (1993); Melody Harris, Hitting 'Em Where it Hurts: Using Title X Litigation
to Bring Gender Equity to Athletics, 72 DENv. U. L. Rav. 57 (1994); Diane Heckman, Women &
Athletics: A Twenty Year Retrospective on Title X 9 U. Mi~ai ENr. & SPORTS L. Ra,. 1 (1992);
Jennifer L. Henderson, Gender Equity in Intercollegiate Athletics: A Commitment to Fairness, 5
SETON HALL J.SPoRT L. 133 (1995); Jodi Hudson, Comment, Complying with Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972: The Never-Ending Race to the Finish Line, 5 SETON HALL J.
SPORT L. 575 (1995); Jill K. Johnson, Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics: Current Judicial Inter-
pretation of the Standards of Compliance, 74 B.U. L. REv. 553 (1994);JanetJudge et al., Gender
Equity in the 1990's: An Athletic Administrator's Survival Guide to Title IX and Gender Equity
Compliance, 5 SETON HALLJ.SPORT L. 313 (1995); Wendy Olson, Beyond Title IX: Toward an
Agenda for Women and Sports in the 1990's, 3 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 105 (1991); Catherine
Pieronek, A Clash of Titans: College Football v. Title IX, 20 J.C. & U.L. 351 (1994); Andrew
Richardson, Sports Law: Cohen v. Brown University; A Title IX Lesson for Colleges and Universi-
ties on Gender Equity, 47 OKLA. L. Rxv. 161 (1994); Symposium, Gender Equity in Sports: An
Analysis of Title IX 2 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L. F. 1 (1995).
For comprehensive treatment of gender equity in athletics, see, e.g., Karen Tokarz, Sex
Discrimination in Amateur and Professional Sports, in 2 LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR
SPORTS (Gary A. Uberstine ed., 1994); ELLEN J. VARGtAs, BREAKING DowN BARRIERS: A
LEGAL GUIDE TO TITLE IX (1994).
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women at the intercollegiate level.4 But recently, as girls contend
for better opportunities in interscholastic sports, a new battle-
ground has emerged on the high school and middle school levels.
While the struggle for gender equity in intercollegiate sports is by
no means over, the purpose of this Article is to examine this newly
emerging front. Clearly, without concomitant progress for
younger girls in interscholastic sports, the promise of full and
meaningful athletic opportunities for intercollegiate women will
remain theoretically problematic and practically unrealistic.
This Article is born of our experience in litigating two federal
cases based primarily on Title IX.5 As of this writing, the litigation
is ongoing, so the final story has yet to be told. Our purpose here
is to provide information on the progression of this type of litiga-
tion based on our experiences. What follows is a "how-to" guide
for the initiation of Title IX litigation aimed at achieving gender
equity in interscholastic sports. A subsequent article will track the
progress of the litigation.
II. THE TITLE IX MANDATE AND ITS APPLICATION TO
INTERSCHOLASTIC SPORTS
A. Histoiy of Title IX
In 1972, Congress passed Title IX of the Education Amend-
ments. The clear statutory purpose of Title IX is to eliminate dis-
crimination on the basis of gender in educational institutions. The
statute provides: "No person in the United States shall, on the basis
of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance .... "6 The legisla-
tive history indicates that Title IX was to be "a strong and compre-
hensive measure [which would] provide women with solid legal
protection from the persistent, pernicious discrimination which is
serving to perpetuate second-class citizenship for American
4 At the college level, there were only 32,000 women competing in 1972. By 1989,
there were more than 130,000 college women athletes. See Sally B. Donnelly, Work That
Body! Fewer Curves, More Muscles: A Sweat-Soaked Revolution Redefines the Shape of Beauty, TIME,
Oct. 1, 1990, at 68. By all accounts, these numbers continue to increase.
5 The two cases are now pending in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Oklahoma. Randolph v. Owasso Indep. Sch. Dist., No. I-011, No. 96-CV-0105-K
(N.D. Okla. filed Feb. 15, 1996); Bull v. Tulsa Pub. Schs., No. 96-C-0180H (N.D. Okla. filed
Mar. 8, 1996).
Title IX is not the only legal basis on which to challenge discriminatory treatment on
the basis of sex. Gender-based classifications can also be challenged under the 14th
Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). See VARGYAS, supra note 3, at 6 n.3.
6 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (a).
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women. 7
In 1979, the United States Supreme Court recognized a pri-
vate right of action under Title IX in Cannon v. University of Chi-
cago. The Court's holding means that individuals can bring
actions pursuant to Title IX directly, without having to exhaust ad-
ministrative procedures. Thus, "aggrieved individuals can directly
enforce their Title IX rights in court without first bringing their
claims before an administrative agency."9
However, in 1984, the ability of Title IX to effectively deal with
the disparity between male and female athletic programs was un-
dercut by the Supreme Court decision in Grove City College v. Bell."
In that case, the Court held that the scope of Tide IX was limited
to specific programs or activities within an educational institution
that directly received financial support from the federal govern-
ment.11 In the context of interscholastic athletics, the Bell decision
meant that unless the athletic department of a school district di-
rectly received federal funds, Title IX was inapplicable to its sports
programs. 1
2
The holding of Bell and its disarming of Title IX was short-
lived, as Congress subsequently passed the Civil Rights Restoration
Act of 1987.13 In this legislation, Congress made clear that the pro-
gram-specific approach was not the intended application of Title
IX. 14 The Act clarified that "program or activity," for purposes of
Title IX, applies to any program or activity of an educational insti-
tution so long as any part of the institution receives federal finan-
cial assistance.15 Thus, the athletic department of a school district
7 118 CONG. REc. 5804 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Bayh).
8 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
9 VARGYAS, supra note 3, at 12.
10 465 U.S. 555 (1984). For additional scholarly discussion of the Bell case, see Karen
Czapanskiy, Grove City College v. Bell: Touchdown or Touchback?, 43 MD. L. REV. 379 (1984);
Renee Forseth et al., Comment, Progress in Gender Equity?: An Overview of the History and
Future of Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972, 2 VILL. SPORTS & ErNr. L. F. 51, 62-
64 (1995).
11 Bell 465 U.S. at 573-75.
12 Prior to Bell, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit had held that
Title IX was applicable to a university because it received federal financial assistance even
though the athletic department did not receive any such funding. See Haffer v. Temple
Univ., 688 F.2d 14, 16 (3d Cir. 1982).
13 Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (Mar. 22, 1988).
14 S. REP. No. 64, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4 (1987), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 6
("[D]iscrimination is prohibited throughout entire agencies or institutions if any part re-
ceives Federal financial assistance.").
15 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (1994). This section provides:
For the purposes of this chapter, the term "program or activity" and "program"
mean all of the operations of-
(2) (A) a college, university, or other postsecondary institution, or a
public system of higher education; or
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must comply with Title IX if the school district receives any federal
funding for any purpose. As one court has said: "Congress has
made clear its intent to extend the scope of Title IX's equal oppor-
tunity obligations to the furthest reaches of an institution's
programs."16
Disagreement also existed as to the available remedies under
Title IX. Prior to 1992, there was a conflict among circuits on the
issue of whether Title IX authorized an award of monetary dam-
ages." The Supreme Court settled the issue in Franklin v. Gwinnett
County Public Schools,18 holding that "a damages remedy is available
for an action brought to enforce Title IX." 19 The Supreme Court
rejected the argument that monetary damages are improper for a
violation of a statute passed pursuant to Congress's Spending
Clause power.20 While the Court did not decide whether Title IX
is a Spending Clause statute, the court held that compensatory
damages are allowed for "intentional violations" of Title IX. 2 1
B. The Administrative Interpretation
1. The Regulations
Following the passage of Title IX, the United States Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Welfare ("HEW"), pursuant to its
congressional mandate,22 adopted regulations interpreting Title IX
in 1975.23 HEW quickly made it clear that Title IX was applicable
to educational sports programs. 24 With the creation of the United
States Department of Education ("DED") as a separate entity in
1979,25 the DED replicated its predecessor's regulations. 26 Federal
(B) a local education agency.., system of vocational education, or
other school system...
any part of which is extended Federal financial assistance ....
Id.
16 Homer v. Kentucky High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 43 F.3d 265, 272 (6th Cir. 1994).
17 Compare Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 911 F.2d 617, 622 (11th Cir. 1990)
(holding that damages were not allowed under Title IX), rev'd, 503 U.S. 60 (1992), with
Pfeiffer v. Marion Ctr. Area Sch. Dist., 917 F.2d 779, 787-89 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding dam-
ages are available under Title IX).
18 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
19 Id. at 76.
20 Id. at 74-75.
21 Id. at 75-76.
22 Education Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 193-380, Tide VIII, § 844, 84 Stat. 484,
612 (1974).
23 40 Fed. Reg. 24,128 (1975) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 86) (1996).
24 Although bills were introduced in Congress to disapprove HEW's Title IX athletic
regulations, none passed. See V.a YAs, supra note 3, at 8 (citing S. Con. Res. 52, 121 CONG.
REc. 22,940 (1975); H.R. Con. Res. 311, 121 CONG. REC. 19,209 (1975)).
25 See 20 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3510 (1994).
26 Compare 45 C.F.R. pt. 86 (1996) (HEW (now "HHS") regulations), with 34 C.F.R. pt.
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courts have given the regulations considerable deference in inter-
preting and applying Title IX.17  Furthermore, 34 C.F.R.
§ 106.41 (a) includes both intercollegiate and interscholastic athlet-
ics within the "program or activity" requirements of Title IX.2 8
Thus, the regulations are an important part of litigation to enforce
Title IX's requirements on interscholastic athletic programs.
The regulations specify ten factors that are to be considered in
the determination of whether an institution is complying with Title
IX's mandate of equal athletic opportunity. Those factors are:
(1) whether the selection of sports and levels of competition
effectively accommodate the interests and abilities of mem-
bers of both sexes;29
(2) the provision of equipment and supplies;30
(3) scheduling of games and practice time;3'
(4) travel and per diem allowance;3 2
(5) opportunity to receive coaching and academic tutoring;33
(6) assignment and compensation of coaches and tutors;34
(7) provision of locker rooms, practice and competitive
facilities;35
(8) provision of medical and training facilities and services;36
(9) provision of housing and dining facilities and services;37
and
(10) publicity.38
The first of these factors is probably the most important. Courts
have held that "an institution may violate Title IX solely by failing
to effectively accommodate the interests and abilities of student
athletes of both sexes." 39 The other factors (two through ten)4 are
also very important and are a part of Title IX's mandate for equal-
ity between male and female athletic programs.
106 (1996) (DED regulations). For cases noting the replication of these regulations, see
Homer, 43 F.3d at 273; Cohen, 991 F.2d at 895.
27 See, e.g., ohen, 991 F.2d at 895 (citing Chevron U.SA Inc. v. Natural Resources De-
fense Counsel, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)).
28 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(a) (1996).
29 Id. § 106.41(c)(1).
30 Id. § 106.41(c)(2).
31 Id. § 106.41(c) (3).
32 Id. § 106.41(c) (4).
33 Id. § 106.41 (c) (5).
34 Id. § 106.41(c) (6).
35 Id. § 106.41(c) (7).
36 Id. § 106.41 (c) (8).
37 Id. § 106.41 (c) (9).
38 Id. § 106.41 (c)(10).
39 Kelley v. Board of Trustees, 35 F.3d 265, 268 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing Roberts, 998 F.2d
at 828; Cohen, 991 F.2d at 897-98).
40 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (c)(10).
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2. The Policy Interpretation
In an attempt to further clarify Title IX's statutory and regula-
tory mandate, the Office of Civil Rights ("OCR") of HEW issued a
policy interpretation of Title IX and its regulations ("Policy Inter-
pretation").41 While the Policy Interpretation does not possess the
same "force of law" status as the Title IX statute and Title IX regu-
lations,42 it has been used as a standard of Title IX compliance by
many courts.43 Further, although the Policy Interpretation focuses
on colleges and universities, it expressly states that its "general
principles will often apply . . . to interscholastic athletics."4 4
The Policy Interpretation provides that, in order to comply
with Title IX and its regulations, educational institutions must pro-
vide equal athletic opportunities in three general areas.45 First,
there must be an equivalent awarding of scholarships.46 This re-
quirement, however, is less relevant in the area of interscholastic
athletics as scholarships are generally not awarded at the interscho-
lastic level. Therefore, the scholarship requirements will usually
not be at issue in an interscholastic Title IX case. Secondly, educa-
tional institutions must provide equal participation opportunities
in athletics. 47 This requirement includes both the number of op-
portunities and the accommodation of both males and females in
selection of sports and level of competition.4" Finally, there must
be equal treatment and benefits for both sexes. 49 The equal treat-
ment and benefits include those factors listed in the regulations
other than participation opportunities.51
The OCR's Policy Interpretation sets out the test which deter-
mines whether an institution is complying with Title IX's require-
ment of equal opportunity for participation. The overall test in the
area of participation is actually composed of three individual tests:
(1) Whether intercollegiate level participation opportuni-
41 Title IX of Education Amendments of 1972; a Policy Interpretation; Title IX and
Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,414 (1979) [hereinafter Policy
Interpretation].
42 See Pederson v. Louisiana State Univ., 912 F. Supp. 892, 910 (M.D. La. 1996) ("The
Policy Interpretation does not have the binding effect of those rules, regulations or orders
authorized by [Title IX].").
43 See, e.g., Cohen, 991 F.2d at 896-900.
44 Policy Interpretation, 40 Fed. Reg. at 71,413.
45 Id.
46 Id.; see 34 C.F.R. § 106.37(c) (1996).
47 Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. at 71,414.
48 See supra notes 28-40 and accompanying text.
49 Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. at 71,414.
50 Id. at 71,415-17; 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (c) (2)-(10).
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ties for male and female students are provided in numbers sub-
stantially proportionate to their respective enrollments; or
(2) Where the members of one sex have been and are un-
derrepresented among intercollegiate athletes, whether the in-
stitution can show a history and continuing practice of program
expansion which is demonstrably responsive to the developing
interest and abilities of the members of that sex; or
(3) Where the members of one sex are underrepresented
among intercollegiate athletes, and the institution cannot show
a continuing practice of program expansion such as that cited
above, whether it can be demonstrated that the interests and
abilities of the members of that sex have been fully and effec-
tively accommodated by the present program..51
Again, although the Policy Interpretation uses the term "intercolle-
giate," the test is applicable to interscholastic athletics.52
As to the first test, it has been termed a "safe harbor,"55 al-
lowing easy determination of Tide IX compliance.54 This first test
does not take into consideration females' interest in athletics;
rather, it is only based on comparing enrollment with actual partic-
ipation.5 Although determination of compliance is easy under
this test, actually meeting the test is probably "unlikely. 5 6
Satisfaction of gender equity under the second test requires
program expansion for females by the educational institution.
However, this test recognizes that "Tide IX does not require that
[an educational institution] leap to complete gender parity in a
single bound." 7 However, "in an era of fiscal austerity, few [educa-
tional institutions] are prone to expand athletic opportunities,"5 8
especially of the continuous nature required by the second test.59
The third test, "full and effective accommodation," has been
declared a very high standard for an educational institution to
prove, although it may be the one on which a school most often
attempts to rely.60 The Policy Interpretation, however, does not
require an educational institution to offer a sport "absent a reason-
able expectation" that the sport can be sustained and competition
51 Id. at 71,418.
52 Id. at 71,413.
53 Cohen, 991 F.2d at 897.
54 Id. at 897-98.
55 See id. at 899.
56 Id. at 898.
57 Id
58 Id.
59 The court in Cohen emphasized that there must be "a continuing practice of program
expansion." Id. at 903.
60 Id. at 898.
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from other schools is available.6 ' Educational institutions, how-
ever, are required to "actively encourage such competition" on be-
half of the underrepresented sex.62 Clearly, expansion of what
constitutes equality in participation opportunities is one of the
cores of the Policy Interpretation.
The other requirement of the Policy Interpretation relevant to
interscholastic athletics is the benefits provided to sports teams.
The Policy Interpretation basically tracks the factors listed in the
regulations (other than participation opportunities) and expands
upon them. For example, the regulations provide that compliance
with Tide IX may be measured by the "compensation of coaches."63
The Policy Interpretation, on the other hand, details what factors
constitute equality in compensating coaches of sports teams of dif-
ferent sexes. Those factors include rate of pay, duration of any
contract, conditions of renewal, experience, nature of duties, and
working conditions. Other benefits are also discussed in the Policy
Interpretation, such as equipment, trainers, tutors, and scheduling
of practices and games. Thus, the Policy Interpretation is an inval-
uable resource to aid in the determination of whether an educa-
tional institution is meeting Title IX's mandates.
The most recent development on the administrative level has
been the issuance of the Title IX Clarification Statement by the
OCR. Issued on January 16, 1996, the Title IX Clarification State-
ment retains and expands upon the three part analysis of equality
in athletic opportunities. As to the first part, statistical proportion-
ality can be achieved by counting, as participants, athletes who are,
for example, only on the practice squad or who have been red-
shirted. Furthermore, substantial proportionality may be met
when the educational institution would only need to add a number
of athletic opportunities to comply with Title IX that is less than
the number which would be required to field a whole team.
As to the second part, the OCR will consider an institution's
"affirmative responses to requests by students or others for addi-
tion or elevation of sports" when analyzing program expansion. As
to the last part, OCR will consider the level of unmet interest, suffi-
cient student ability to sustain a program, and the expectation of
competition when measuring full and effective accommodation.
While it will provide a guide to athletic programs that may be on
the verge of Title IX compliance, the Clarification Statement will
61 Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,418 (1979).
62 Id,
63 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (c) (6) (1996).
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have little impact on the majority of litigation seeking to improve
interscholastic athletic programs that are, all too often, far from
meeting Title IX mandates.
C. Title IX Case Law
Currently there are three Title IX cases involving intercollegi-
ate athletics that are widely cited and followed by many courts.64
First, in Cohen v. Brown University,65 the university made a decision
to discontinue offering women's volleyball, women's gymnastics,
men's water polo, and men's golf.66 The changes did not affect the
opportunity ratios under the first prong of the Policy Interpreta-
tion's accommodation test.67 However, the opportunity ratio at
Brown already strongly favored males. 6 The members of the wo-
men's volleyball and gymnastics teams filed suit claiming Brown
University was in violation of Title IX. 69 The district court issued a
preliminary injunction forcing Brown to reinstate volleyball and
gymnastics. 70
Brown then appealed the preliminary injunction. First, it chal-
lenged Title IX's statutory and regulatory scheme as an unconstitu-
tional violation of equal protection.71 The First Circuit quickly
dismissed this claim, reasoning that Title IX does not disadvantage
males, but rather seeks to give opportunities to females and that
the statute was within Congress's remedial powers. 72 The Court
then found that the district court had correctly determined that
the women athletes were likely to be successful on the merits of
their case because they could prove that there was a numerical dis-
parity under the first part of the Policy Interpretation test and that
there were unmet interests of females at the university under the
third part of the test.7 3 This decision is significant because the
court refused to merge the first and the third parts of the test,
which would have allowed a university to comply with Title IX by
offering athletic opportunities proportionate to the level of inter-
64 See, e.g., George A. Davidson & Carla A. Kerr, Title I'X What is Gender Equity?, 2 VILL.
SPORTS & ENrT. L. F. 25, 37-42 (1995).
65 991 F.2d 888.
66 Id. at 892.
67 Id.
68 Id. Males were given 63.4% of the student athletic opportunities at Brown, while
females had available to them 36.6% of the student athletic opportunities. Id.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 893.
71 Id. at 900.
72 Id. at 900-01.
73 It. at 902.
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ests of males and females.74 The Cohen case today survives as one of
the landmark cases in Title IX litigation.
The second widely cited case is the Tenth Circuit decision in
Roberts v. Colorado State Board of Agriculture.75 There the court was
faced with an appeal by the governmental entity that controlled
Colorado State University. The district court had ordered both the
Board and the University to reinstate women's fast-pitch softball
because it found that the discontinuation of the sport by the Uni-
versity caused the University to be in violation of Title IX. 76 The
University claimed that simultaneous and similar cuts in the
number of teams for both men and women did not, in general,
violate Title IX and, specifically, the third part of the Policy Inter-
pretation's effective accommodation test.77 The Tenth Circuit re-
jected this claim, as did the Cohen court, because "full and effective
accommodation" is not achieved by offering athletic opportunities
only proportionate to the perceived interest of males and females;
rather, all interests of the underrepresented sex must be accommo-
dated.78 Proving that there were unmet interests of females at Col-
orado State University was easy, as those with unmet interests were
before the court.79
The third widely cited Title IX case is Favia v. Indiana Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania."° As in both Cohen and Roberts, the Favia court
was faced with an educational institution that had cut both male
and female sports teams, specifically women's gymnastics and field
hockey and men's tennis and soccer."1 Members of the women's
gymnastics and field hockey teams filed suit seeking an injunction
requiring the University to reinstate their teams. The district court
74 Id. at 899. By way of illustration, the court gave the following example:
Suppose a university (Oooh U.) has a student body consisting of 1,000 men and
1,000 women, a one to one ratio. If 500 men and 250 women are able and
interested athletes, the ratio of interested men to interested women is two to
one. Brown takes the position that both the actual gender composition of the
student body the question of and whether there is unmet interest among the
underrepresented gender are irrelevant; in order to satisfy the third bench-
mark, Oooh U. must only provide athletic opportunities in line with the two to
one interested athlete ratio, say, 100 slots for men and 50 slots for women.
Under this view, the interest of 200 women would be unmet-but there would
be no Title IX violation.
We think that Brown's perception of the Title IX universe is myopic.
75 998 F.2d 824.
76 Id. at 826.
77 Id. at 831.
78 Id. at 831-32 (citing Cohen, 991 F.2d at 898).
79 See id. at 831.
80 7 F.3d 332.
81 Id. at 335. However, the cuts saved men's athletics only $35,000 while women's ath-
letics were saddled with a $110,000 hit. Id,
[Vol. 15:371
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authorized the preliminary injunction, but the University failed to
appeal. However, after the time to appeal had run, the University
filed a motion to modify the injunction that requested permission
to replace gymnastics with women's soccer. The University sought
to support the modification on the basis that a change in circum-
stances surrounding the athletic programs supported modification.
The district court denied the motion. On appeal, the Third Cir-
cuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in deny-
ing the motion to modify. The Third Circuit was satisfied with the
district court's holding that the proposed modification would not
ameliorate any Title IX violation.
One of the most important recent Title IX cases is Pederson v.
Louisiana State University.82 In Pederson, the plaintiffs sought an in-
junction requiring Louisiana State University ("LSU") to begin
fielding teams in women's soccer and women's fast-pitch softball,
as well as a declaration that LSU's athletic program was in violation
of Title IX.83 In discussing the law of Title IX, the court noted its
disapproval of the Policy Interpretation's three part test,84 as well
as the holdings of Cohen and Roberts which stated that the first part
was a "safe harbor" based entirely on enrollment rather than inter-
est.85 However, the court found that LSU had not effectively ac-
commodated female athletes and lacked a history of expanding
opportunities for females.86 Thus, the court held that LSU was in
violation of Title IX.87 This case is important because it under-
scores the fact that educational institutions are very often not in
compliance with Title IX and will be found to have violated Title
IX even when a court "waters down" the legal standards.
III. PRACTICAL PROBLEMS
The substantive law surrounding Title IX is relatively clear.
Equally apparent to most observers is the fact that many interscho-
lastic sports programs are not in compliance. Still, there are formi-
dable problems that stand in the way of Title IX litigation.
A. Anti-Solicitation Rules
Many state bar association rules prohibit direct contact by a
lawyer with a prospective client. Therefore, although an attorney
82 912 F. Supp. 892.
83 Id. at 897.
84 Id. at 910-11.
85 Id. at 913-14.
86 Id at 917.
87 Id.
1997]
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may be aware that a large disparity exists between boys and girls
athletic programs in a school district, the attorney is often prohib-
ited from making direct contact with the girls or their parents.
The American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct, widely copied throughout the nation, contains such a restric-
tion."8 Model Rule 7.3(a) provides:
A lawyer shall not by in-person or live telephone contact
solicit professional employment from a prospective client with
whom the lawyer has no family or prior professional relationship
when a significant motive for the lawyer's doing so is the lawyer's
pecuniary gain.89
Similarly, in states where the professional rules for attorneys fol-
lows the American Bar Association's Model Code of Professional
Responsibility, Disciplinary Rule 2-104(A) provides:
A lawyer who has given in-person unsolicited advice to a
layperson that he should obtain counsel or take legal action
shall not accept employment resulting from that advice .... 9
The premise behind these rules is that prospective clients "may al-
ready feel overwhelmed by the circumstances giving rise to the
need for legal services" and "may find it difficult fully to evaluate all
available alternatives."91
However, soliciting clients for Title IX litigation may be con-
sidered a constitutionally protected form of speech. In 1978, the
Supreme Court held that anti-solicitation rules were unenforceable
as applied in In re Primus.9 2 In that case, pregnant mothers in
Aiken County, South Carolina were forced to submit to steriliza-
tion "as a condition of the continued receipt of medical assistance
under the Medicaid program."" Edna Smith Primus was an attor-
ney in private practice in the area and had a relationship with both
the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") and the South Caro-
lina Council on Human Relations.94 She attended a meeting with
the pregnant mothers and representatives of a local group serving
the poor.95 After the meeting, the ACLU agreed to provide legal
services to the women and Primus informed one of the women of
88 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3(a) (1983).
89 Id.
90 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-104(A) (1981).
91 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3(a) cmt. 1 (1983).
92 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
93 Id. at 415.
94 Id. at 414-15.
95 Id. at 415.
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the free legal representation.96 Subsequently, the South Carolina
Supreme Court found Primus had solicited a client in violation of
its ethical rules.97
The United States Supreme Court, however, reversed the sanc-
tion. The Court first determined that Primus's conduct came
"within the generous zone of First Amendment protection reserved
for associational freedoms '98 Accordingly, the Court then held
that the disciplinary rule had to be justified under a high level of
scrutiny." Because of the Court's reliance on the associational re-
lationship in Primus, it is unclear whether direct participation in a
public interest group is required. The Court specifically character-
ized the petitioner as "seeking to further political and ideological
goals through associational activity." 100
Further, solicitation of clients for Title IX cases could be per-
missible, without the protection of the First Amendment, if the pri-
mary motive is not the lawyer's pecuniary interest.101
B. Willing Plaintiffs, Attorney's Fees and Costs
"Hell hath no fury like the parent of an athletic daughter
scorned."102
We were first contacted by a highly respected volleyball coach
in Tulsa who was concerned about the failure of the Tulsa Public
Schools to offer girls the opportunity to play interscholastic volley-
ball. This coach was running her own leagues and camps out of a
local Young Men's Christian Association ("YMCA"). She contacted
Professor Yasser after one of the players in one of her adult
leagues, a law student, heard her bemoaning the lack of interscho-
lastic opportunities for girls to play volleyball. The law student told
the coach about a Sports Law class taught by Professor Yasser at the
University of Tulsa College of Law, and the coach called the profes-
sor. This led to an initial meeting between the coach and the pro-
fessor, at which time the two agreed to hold a meeting for coaches,
parents, and players interested in kick-starting girls' interscholastic
volleyball in Tulsa. This first meeting was held at a local YMCA.
This initial meeting in turn led to a series of meetings in which
96 Id. at 416.
97 Id. at 421.
98 Id. at 431.
99 Id. at 432 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S.
516 (1960)).
100 Primus, 436 U.S. at 414.
101 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3(a) (1983).
102 Ray Yasser, quoted in, David Hill, A Price for Equity, TCHR. MAc., Aug. 1996.
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interested parents and coaches mulled over their options with
Yasser and Schiller, who were by this time associated with the
cause. Parents and coaches were advised to first make a good faith
effort to work through the system by making requests for Title IX
compliance to school administrators. Invariably, school adminis-
trators did not know what Title IX required, and exhibited little
enthusiasm for taking the necessary steps to move into compliance.
With a growing sense of frustration, a number of the parents
moved toward the litigation option. The parents from Owasso,
Oklahoma were somewhat advanced in their resolve, and the deci-
sion was made to file their suit first.
We agreed to seek attorney's fees from the defendants, pursu-
ant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1988.1°3 This, of course, required that we
prevail on the merits. We were willing to undertake that risk, confi-
dent that the existing legal framework ensured our ultimate suc-
cess. Parents put together a modest "war chest" to defray the costs
of litigation. Under Section 1988, these costs are also recoverable
by the prevailing party.
IV. THE CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
With assistance from the National Women's Law Center, we
drafted the following complaint,1 °4 which is annotated with our
comments in bold type.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
RON RANDOLPH, as parent and ) Case No.
next friend of his minor
daughter, AMANDA M. (MIMI) ) 96-CV-0105K
RANDOLPH; COY E. & CANDACE L.
BROWN, as parents and next ) CLASS ACTION
friend of their minor
daughter, HAYLEY E.BROWN; )
ROBERT C. & SUSAN J. PARKER
as parents and next friend
103 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1994).
104 This complaint is modeled on the complaint in the case of Thomsen v. Fremont
Public School District #1, No. 4CV95-3124 (Dist. Of Neb.) (Filed April 10, 1995). It was
provided to us by Deborah Brake and Judith Appelbaum from the National Women's Law
Center in Washington, D.C. They served as co-counsel with Alan G. Stoler of Omaha,
Nebraska and Kristen M. Galles and William C. Crenshaw of Powell, Goldstein, Frazer &
Murphy in Washington, D.C.
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of their minor daughter,
SARAH J. PARKER; ROBERT C. &
SUSAN J. PARKER, as parents
and next friend of their
minor daughter, REBEKAH S.
PARKER, ROBERT F. & VICKI L.
RANDOLPH, JR., as parents
and next friend of their
minor daughter, TERI JO
RANDOLPH; JIM & KAY PIGG, as
as parents and next friend
of their minor daughter,
MELISA PIGG; TOM & BECKY
MARTIN, as parents and next
friend of their minor
daughter, SHERA MAE MARTIN;





DISTRICT NO. I-011, a/k/a
OWASSO PUBLIC SCHOOLS; DALE
JOHNSON, individually and in
his official capacity as
Superintendent; RICK DOSSETT,
individually and in his official
capacity as Principal; JOHN
SCOTT, individually and in his
official capacity as Athletic
Director; and Does 1 through
50,
Defendants.
The above-captioned Plaintiffs, as parents and next friends of
their minor daughters, and on behalf of all others similarly situated
("Plaintiffs"), respectfully file this Complaint against Defendants,
OWASSO INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. I-011, a/k/a
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OWASSO PUBLIC SCHOOLS; DALE JOHNSON, individually and
in his official capacity as Superintendent; RICK DOSSETT, individ-
ually and in his official capacity as Principal; JOHN SCOTT, indi-
vidually and in his official capacity as Athletic Director; and Does 1
through 50, and allege as follows:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1. This action is posed as a class action for declaratory and
injunctive relief brought on behalf of female students at Owasso
Public Schools ("Owasso") in Owasso, Oklahoma. [While a purely
pecuniary consideration might argue for a number of smaller ac-
tions, all with statutory fees available, a class action provides the
greatest opportunity to "fix the system."] The named plaintiffs are
also seeking compensatory damages in their individual capacities.
Defendants have violated (1) Title IX of the Education Amend-
ment of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. ("Title IX") and the regula-
tions adopted thereto, and (2) the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 42
U.S.C. § 1983, by intentionally denying the female students at
Owasso (1) an equal opportunity to participate in interscholastic
and other school-sponsored athletics and (2) the equal treatment
and benefits that must necessarily accompany an equal opportunity
to participate.
2. Defendants' denial of equal participation and equal treat-
ment and benefits constitutes intentional discrimination against
the named plaintiffs and all members of the class based solely on
their gender. Specifically, as to unequal participation opportuni-
ties, Defendants have discriminated against female students at
Owasso in the accommodation of student interests and abilities in
athletics by knowingly and intentionally selecting and offering
sports and levels of competition in a manner which discriminates
against female students. Notwithstanding the significant number
of female students at Owasso who have the interest and abilities
necessary to participate in athletics, Defendants have refused to
provide them with an equal opportunity to do so. Furthermore, as
to unequal treatment and benefits, Defendants have discriminated
against Owasso's female students in the following areas: (1) equip-
ment and supplies; (2) scheduling of games and practice times; (3)
travel; (4) opportunity to receive qualified coaching; (5) assign-
ment and compensation of coaches; (6) provision of locker rooms
and facilities for both practice and competition; and (7) publicity.
3. This action seeks to redress the deprivation of the named
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plaintiffs' rights and the rights of the class to an equal opportunity
to participate in interscholastic and other school-sponsored athlet-
ics and to receive the equal treatment and benefits which must nec-
essarily accompany an equal opportunity to participate. This
action seeks a declaratory judgment that Defendants have violated
the rights of Owasso's female students under federal law and the
United States Constitution. This action further seeks an injunction
requiring Defendants to immediately cease their discriminatory
practices and to remedy the effects of their discriminatory practices
and to remedy the effects of their discriminatory conduct.
4. Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief which, among other things,
requires that Defendants sponsor and fund a sufficient number of
additional athletic teams for female students to obtain meaningful
participation opportunities which are comparable to those offered
to male students enrolled at Owasso.
5. Plaintiffs further seek injunctive relief which requires that
Defendants provide the girls' athletic teams at Owasso with equal
treatment and benefits as Owasso already provides to its boys' ath-
letic teams.
6. The named Plaintiffs, in their capacities as the parents and
next friends of their minor daughters, seek monetary relief in or-
der to compensate them for their damages resulting from Defend-
ants' discrimination in its athletics program, including, among
other things, (1) the actual out-of-pocket costs incurred in paying
for equipment and supplies for their daughters to participate in
interscholastic and other school-sponsored athletics which would
not be incurred by parents of boys similarly situated, (2) the dam-
ages associated with their daughters' lost opportunities to partici-
pate in athletics, (3) the damages associated with their daughters'
reduced opportunities to obtain college athletic scholarships, and
(4) the emotional distress and other damages resulting from their
daughters' being subjected to unequal treatment and benefits in
athletics on the basis of gender.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
7. The first claim arises under 20 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq. and its
interpreting regulations. Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by
28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a) (3), and 1343(a) (4).
8. The second claim also arises under 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.
and its interpreting regulations. Jurisdiction is conferred on this
Court by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a) (3), and 1343(a) (4).
9. The third claim arises under the Equal Protection Clause
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of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by 28
U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a) (3), and 1343(a) (4).
10. Jurisdiction for declaratory and other relief is invoked
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 (a) and 2202.
11. Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). These
claims arose in Owasso, Oklahoma, which is within the jurisdiction
of this Court.
THE PARTIES
[This section of the complaint introduces the athletes as real
people who have suffered real discrimination.]
12. Plaintiff Ron Randolph is the father of Mimi Randolph, a
15-year-old 10th grade student at Owasso High School. Mimi is a
talented athlete who participates in interscholastic softball. She
has thus endured the unequal treatment and benefits directed by
Owasso toward their female athletes. In addition, her opportuni-
ties to participate in interscholastic and other school-sponsored
athletics are not comparable to the opportunities afforded to boys
who are similarly situated. The Randolphs are residents of Owasso,
Oklahoma, which is within the jurisdiction of this Court.
13. Plaintiffs Candace and Coy Brown are the parents of
Hayley Brown, a 13-year-old 8th grade student at Owasso Middle
School. Hayley is a talented athlete who participates in softball.
Her opportunities to participate in interscholastic and other
school-sponsored athletics are not comparable to the opportunities
afforded to boys who are similarly situated. The Browns are resi-
dents of Owasso, Oklahoma, which is within the jurisdiction of this
Court.
14. Plaintiffs Susan and Robert Parker are the parents of Sa-
rah J. Parker, a 16-year-old l1th grade student at Owasso High
School. Sarah is a talented athlete who participates in interscholas-
tic soccer. She has thus endured the unequal treatment and bene-
fits directed by Owasso toward their female athletes. In addition,
her opportunities to participate in interscholastic and other
school-sponsored athletics are not comparable to the opportunities
afforded to boys who are similarly situated. The Parkers are resi-
dents of Owasso, Oklahoma, which is within the jurisdiction of this
Court.
15. Plaintiffs Susan and Robert Parker are the parents of
Rebekah S. Parker, a 14-year-old 9th grade student at Owasso High
School. Rebekah is a talented athlete who participates in inter-
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scholastic soccer. She has thus endured the unequal treatment
and benefits directed by Owasso toward their female athletes. In
addition, her opportunities to participate in interscholastic and
other school-sponsored athletics are not comparable to the oppor-
tunities afforded to boys who are similarly situated. The Parkers
are residents of Owasso, Oklahoma, which is within the jurisdiction
of this Court.
16. Plaintiffs Vicki L. and Robert F. Randolph are the par-
ents of Terijo Randolph, a 12-year-old 6th grade student at Owasso
Middle School. Teri Jo is a talented athlete who participates in
softball and basketball. Her opportunities to participate in inter-
scholastic and other school-sponsored athletics are not comparable
to the opportunities afforded to boys who are similarly situated.
The Randolphs are residents of Owasso, Oklahoma, which is within
the jurisdiction of this Court.
17. Plaintiffs Kay and Jim Pigg are the parents of Melisa Pigg,
a 16-year-old 10th grade student at Owasso High School. Melisa is
a talented athlete who participates in interscholastic softball. She
has thus endured the unequal treatment and benefits directed by
Owasso toward their female athletes. In addition, her opportuni-
ties to participate in interscholastic and other school-sponsored
athletics are not comparable to the opportunities afforded to boys
who are similarly situated. The Piggs are residents of Owasso,
Oklahoma, which is within the jurisdiction of this Court.
18. Plaintiffs Becky and Tom Martin are the parents of Shera
Martin, a 16-year-old l1th grade student at Owasso High School.
Shera is a talented athlete who participates in interscholastic soft-
ball. She has thus endured the unequal treatment and benefits
directed by Owasso toward their female athletes. In addition, her
opportunities to participate in interscholastic and other school-
sponsored athletics are not comparable to the opportunities af-
forded to boys who are similarly situated. The Martins are resi-
dents of Owasso, Oklahoma, which is within the jurisdiction of this
Court.
19. Defendant Owasso Independent School District No. I-
011, a/k/a Owasso Public Schools, is a public school district au-
thorized by 70 Okla. Stat. § 1-101 et seq. to operate and control
Owasso Public Schools, where the Plaintiffs' daughters are stu-
dents. Therefore, Owasso's conduct is considered state action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendant Owasso is located in Owasso,
Oklahoma, which is within the jurisdiction of this Court. Since the
passage of Title IX, Owasso has received and continues to receive
federal financial assistance and the benefits therefrom. Therefore,
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all programs at Owasso, including athletics, are subject to the re-
quirements of Title IX.
20. Defendant Johnson is the Superintendent of Schools at
Owasso. Mr. Johnson is a resident of the state of Oklahoma and
thus is subject to the jurisdiction of this Court.
21. Defendant Dossett is the Principal of Owasso's High
School. Mr. Dossett is a resident of the state of Oklahoma and thus
is subject to the jurisdiction of this Court.
22. Defendant Scott is the Athletic Director at Owasso High
School. Mr. Scott is a resident of the state of Oklahoma and thus is
subject to the jurisdiction of this Court.
23. The named Plaintiffs are ignorant of the true names and
capacities of Does 1-50, but believe them to be employees of
Owasso or members of the Owasso School Board. Plaintiffs will
seek to amend this Complaint to set forth their true names and
capacities when they are ascertained. Plaintiffs are informed and
believe, and on that basis allege, that each of these fictitiously
named defendants is responsible in some manner for the discrimi-
natory actions alleged herein and that each is a resident of the
State of Oklahoma and thus is subject to the jurisdiction of this
Court.
CLASS ALLEGATIONS
24. The named Plaintiffs bring these claims on behalf of
their minor daughters, and, pursuant to Rule 23(a) and (b) (2) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for declaratory and injunctive
relief, on behalf of all present and future female students enrolled
at Owasso who participate, seek to participate, or are deterred
from participating in interscholastic and/or other school-spon-
sored athletics at Owasso.
25. Each of the named Plaintiffs' daughters is a student at
Owasso and is an athlete who is subjected to Owasso's unequal
treatment and benefits.
26. In bringing this lawsuit, Plaintiffs seek to require Defend-
ants to comply with Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution by end-
ing their discriminatory policies toward the girls' athletics pro-
grams in Owasso. Accordingly, Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief
requiring Owasso to fund and sponsor girls' sports so that the in-
terests and abilities of all female students at Owasso are accommo-
dated in a non-discriminatory manner. Plaintiffs propose to
represent all female students at Owasso who wish to participate in
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any interscholastic and other school-sponsored athletics that are
not funded and sponsored by Owasso. In addition, Plaintiffs,
whose daughters are currently athletes at Owasso, seek declaratory
and injunctive relief to remedy discrimination against current and
future female athletes at Owasso regarding their receipt of treat-
ment and benefits which are not comparable to those received by
the male athletes.
27. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impractical. It is unknown how many of the current Owasso female
students or how many future Owasso female students would seek to
participate in interscholastic or other school-sponsored athletics, if
additional opportunities were available. Moreover, joinder of all
members is impractical because members of the class who may suf-
fer future injury are not capable of being identified at this time.
28. There are many questions of law and fact common to the
class, including: (a) whether female students at Owasso are being
deprived of equal opportunities to participate in interscholastic
and other school-sponsored athletics, (b) whether female students
at Owasso are receiving unequal treatment and benefits in compar-
ison to the male students at Owasso, and (c) whether Defendants
have been and are discriminating against girls in Owasso's inter-
scholastic and other school-sponsored athletic programs in viola-
tion of Title IX and the United States Constitution.
29. The claims of the named Plaintiffs are typical of the
claims of the class. The types of gender discrimination which
Plaintiffs' daughters have suffered as a result of their gender in-
clude: (1) exclusion from opportunities to participate in the inter-
scholastic and other school-sponsored athletic programs at Owasso
and/or (2) receipt of unequal treatment and benefits in Owasso's
interscholastic or other school-sponsored athletic programs. These
are typical of the types of gender discrimination which members of
the class have suffered, are suffering, and, unless this Court grants
relief, will continue to suffer.
30. The named Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent
and protect the interests of the class. Plaintiffs intend to prosecute
this action rigorously in order to secure remedies for the entire
class.
31. Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds gen-
erally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final de-
claratory and injunctive relief with respect to the class as a whole.
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GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
THE REQUIREMENTS OF TITLE IX
32. Title IX, enacted in 1972, provides in relevant part:
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any education program or ac-
tivity receiving Federal financial assistance.
20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). The Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987
made Congress' intent plain that "program or activity," as used in
Title IX, applies to any program or activity so long as any part of
the public institution receives federal financial assistance. 20
U.S.C. § 1687. Thus, Owasso is subject to Title IX even if none of
the funding for either its girls' or boys' athletic programs comes
specifically from federal sources.
33. In 1975, the Department of Health, Education and Wel-
fare (the predecessor of the United States Department of Educa-
tion ("DOE")) adopted regulations interpreting Title IX. These
regulations are codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 106. (the "Regulations").
34. With regard to athletic programs, 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (a)
provides that interscholastic athletics are included within the "pro-
gram or activity" requirements of Title IX:
No person shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participa-
tion in, be denied the benefits of, be treated differently from
another person or otherwise be discriminated against in any in-
terscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics offered
by a recipient. ...
35. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) specifies ten (10) factors that are to
be considered in the determination of equal athletic opportunity:
1. Whether the selection of sports and levels of competition
effectively accommodate the interest and abilities of mem-
bers of both sexes;
2. The provision of equipment and supplies;
3. Scheduling of games and practice time;
4. Travel and per diem allowance;
5. Opportunity to receive coaching and academic tutoring;
6. Assignment and compensation of coaches and tutors;
7. Provision of locker rooms, practice and competitive
facilities;
8. Provision of medical and training facilities and services;
9. Provision of housing and dining facilities and services; and
10. Publicity.
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Another factor to be considered is a school's "failure to provide
necessary funds for teams for one sex." Id.
36. In 1979, the Office of Civil Rights of the Department of
Education ("OCR") issued a policy interpretation of Title IX and
the Regulations. This policy interpretation is found at 44 Fed. Reg.
71413 (1979) (the "Policy Interpretation").
37. The Policy Interpretation provides that, in order to com-
ply with Title IX and 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c), schools must provide
equal athletic opportunities in three general areas: (1) awarding
of scholarships (aimed primarily at problems at the intercollegiate
level); (2) participation opportunities (including both the number
of opportunities and whether the selection of sports and the level
of competition effectively accommodate the interests and abilities
of members of both sexes); and (3) treatment and benefits. 44
Fed. Reg. at 71414. Although the scholarship regulations are not
at issue in this complaint, equal participation opportunities and
equal treatment and benefits are.
38. According to the Policy Interpretation, compliance in
the area of equivalent participation opportunities is to be deter-
mined by the following three-part test:
(1) whether interscholastic and other school-sponsored ath-
letic participation 105 opportunities for male and female students
are provided in numbers substantially proportionate to their re-
spective enrollments; or
(2) where the members of one sex have been and are under-
represented among interscholastic and other school-sponsored
athletics, whether the institution can show a history and contin-
uing practice of program expansion which is demonstrably re-
sponsive to the developing interest and abilities of the members
of that sex; or
(3) where the members of one sex are underrepresented
among interscholastic and other school-sponsored athletics and
the institution cannot show a continuing practice of program
expansion such as that cited above, whether it can be demon-
strated that the interests and abilities of the members of that sex
have been fully and effectively accommodated by the present
program.106
105 Although the Policy Interpretation refers to "intercollegiate" sports, it is applicable
to all recipients of federal education funds, including high schools, and is, thus, applicable
to interscholastic high school sports, as well as intercollegiate sports. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.11(1996); see also, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,413 (1979) (the Policy Interpretation's "general
principles will often apply to ... interscholastic athletic programs which are also covered
by the Regulations").
106 See 44 Fed. Reg. At 71418.
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39. Under both the Regulations and the Policy Interpreta-
tion, compliance in the area of equal treatment and benefits is as-
sessed based on an overall comparison of the male and female
athletic programs, including an analysis of factors (2) through (10)
of 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (c) listed above and an analysis of whether the
necessary funds are provided for teams of both sexes.
40. The Regulations require that sponsors of interscholastic
and other school-sponsored athletics (such as Owasso) take such
remedial actions as are necessary to overcome the effects of gender
discrimination in violation of Title IX. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.3(a).
On information and belief, Owasso has not taken any significant
recent remedial actions and any remedial actions which Owasso
has taken in the past twenty (20) years have been insufficient to
satisfy Owasso's obligations under Title IX.
41. The Regulations further require that sponsors of inter-
scholastic and other school-sponsored athletics comply with the
Regulations within three years of their effective date (which was
July 21, 1975). Now, more than twenty (20) years later, Owasso has
still not fully complied with Title IX.
THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
42. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution requires that a state shall not "deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the full protection of the laws."
43. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Defendants may be held person-
ally liable for their actions in violating Plaintiffs' daughters' rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
44. Plaintiffs are entitled to injunctive relief to end Defend-
ants' unequal, discriminatory, and unlawful treatment of female
student athletes. Because of Defendants' acts and omissions, Plain-
tiffs' daughters continue to be deprived of the rights guaranteed to
them by the United States Constitution and the laws of the United
States. Failure to grant the injunctive relief requested will result in
irreparable harm to Plaintiffs' daughters in that Plaintiffs' daugh-
ters' Fourteenth Amendment rights will be violated and that Plain-
tiffs' daughters will never be able to participate in interscholastic
and other school-sponsored athletics on an equal basis with their
male classmates, if at all. Accordingly, Plaintiffs do not have an
adequate remedy at law for this harm. This threatened harm far
outweighs any possible harm that granting injunctive relief might
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cause Defendants. Finally, the injunctive relief sought would in no
way disserve the public interest but, on the contrary, would prevent
discrimination based on gender and would promote the goal of
full equality before the law.
ATTORNEYS' FEES
45. Plaintiffs have been required to retain the undersigned
attorneys to prosecute this action. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover
reasonable attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF: TITLE IX
(UNEQUAL PARTICIPATION OPPORTUNITIES)
(CLASS ACTION AGAINST OWASSO ONLY)
46. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate herein by this refer-
ence paragraphs 1 through 46 inclusive of this Complaint.
47. By offering certain opportunities to male students to par-
ticipate in interscholastic and other school-sponsored athletics,
Owasso has demonstrated its determination that athletic opportu-
nities provide educational benefits that should be supported by the
school system. Plaintiffs agree with this determination that athletic
opportunities provide valuable educational benefits. For this very
reason, Plaintiffs contend that their daughters-and all of the fe-
male students at Owasso-should have equal access and opportu-
nity to receive these same benefits that the male students at Owasso
already have. Owasso historically has not provided, and currently
does not provide, its female students with such equal access and
opportunity.
48. Owasso has intentionally violated Title IX by knowingly
and deliberately discriminating against female students at Owasso,
including the daughters of Plaintiffs, by among other things, failing
to provide equal opportunities for females to participate in inter-
scholastic and other school-sponsored athletics.
49. Several of the named Plaintiffs have on numerous occa-
sions informed Owasso that its actions discriminate against their
daughters and against all of Owasso's female students and that
these actions constitute violations of the Title IX rights of these
students. Despite the fact that Plaintiffs have drawn these inequi-
ties to the attention of Owasso, and requested relief, Owasso has
knowingly and consciously continued to fail and refuse to take any
of the necessary actions to remediate any existing violations, even
though the Regulations mandate that it do so.
50. On information and belief, Plaintiffs allege that Owasso
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has failed to comply with each of the three (3) parts of the test for
determining the equal opportunity to participate in athletics under
Title IX described in Paragraph 39 above. In particular, on infor-
mation and belief, Plaintiffs allege that:
(1) The ratio of female to male athletes at Owasso is not sub-
stantially proportionate to the overall ratio of female to
male students at Owasso.
(2) Owasso does not have a history or continuing practice of
program expansion.
(3) Owasso has failed to effectively accommodate the interests
of the female students.
51. Female students have historically been, and continue to
be, underrepresented in Owasso's interscholastic and other school-
sponsored athletic programs. Despite this underrepresentation
and despite the interest and abilities of the female students to par-
ticipate in additional sports (such as volleyball), Owasso has failed
to accommodate this and other interests.
52. Owasso's conduct has persisted despite the information
provided and the requests made by Plaintiffs and despite the man-
dates of the Regulations, particularly 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.3(a) and
106.41(d).
53. Owasso's conduct violates 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., as in-
terpreted by 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.31 and 106.41 and the Policy Inter-
pretation thereof.
54. As a result of Owasso's conduct, the named Plaintiffs
have incurred extensive damages, including, among other things,
(1) the actual out-of-pocket costs incurred in paying for their
daughters to participate in athletics when boys who are similarly
situated would not have to pay, (2) the damages associated with
their daughters' lost opportunities to participate in athletics, (3)
the damages associated with their daughters' reduced opportuni-
ties to obtain college scholarships, and (4) the emotional distress
and other damages resulting from their daughters' being subjected
to unequal treatment and benefits in athletics on the basis of
gender.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF: TITLE IX
(UNEQUAL TREATMENT AND BENEFITS)
(CLASS ACTION AGAINST OWASSO ONLY)
55. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate herein by this refer-
ence paragraphs 1 through 55 inclusive of this Complaint.
56. Owasso, by its conduct, has intentionally violated Title IX
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by knowingly and deliberately discriminating against female stu-
dents, including the daughters of Plaintiffs, by, among other
things, failing to provide female athletes at Owasso with the same
treatment and benefits which are comparable overall to the treat-
ment and benefits provided to male athletes.
57. Many of the named plaintiffs have on numerous occa-
sions informed Owasso that its actions constitute violations of
Plaintiffs' daughters' Title IX rights, as do their failure and refusal
to take actions to remediate any existing violations. Despite being
provided this information, Owasso continues to refuse to remedi-
ate its violations of Title IX. [Of course the petitioners must re-
search this issue in order to back up this allegation.]
58. On information and belief, Plaintiffs allege that Owasso
has failed to comply with Title IX by failing to provide female ath-
letes with comparable treatment and benefits including, but not
limited to, the following areas: [This is the opportunity to lay out
the most glaring of the violations.]
(1) Owasso funds interscholastic and other school-sponsored
athletics in a manner that discriminates against female
athletes.
(2) Owasso provides male athletes with newer equipment and
supplies that are of better quality than those provided to
female athletes. Owasso also provides male athletes with
newer uniforms of better quality on a more frequent basis
than those provided to female athletes.
(3) Owasso unfairly discriminates against female athletes in
the scheduling of their game and practice times.
(a) Girls' varsity softball games are regularly scheduled
in the early afternoon. In order to participate, team
members must miss class, thus adversely affecting
academic performance. Parents and other support-
ers find it difficult to attend.
(b) The boys' baseball team practices during school, for
credit. This is referred to as "6th hour credit." In
fact, 6th hour credit scheduling generally discrimi-
nates against female athletes.
(c) Basketball games are scheduled in a manner which
unfairly discriminates against female athletes.
(4) Female athletes are discriminated against in regard to
travel, both to away games and to practice sites.
(5) Female athletes have fewer opportunities to receive
coaching because several of Owasso's female teams have
fewer coaches and more players per coach than the male
teams. Moreover, Owasso has permitted the use of volun-
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teer coaches in a manner which discriminates against fe-
male athletes.
(6) Owasso selects coaches for female athletic teams with less
care and attention than for male athletic teams. As a re-
sult, the coaches of the female athletic teams often have
less expertise than the coaches of the male athletic teams.
(7) Owasso compensates coaches for the girls' and boys'
teams in a manner which discriminates against female
athletes.
(8) Owasso recently spent a large sum of money to build a
new football stadium. Owasso has not spent any compa-
rable sums of money to build or renovate any of the girls'
athletic facilities. In fact, Owasso has consistently claimed
that they could not put money into the girls' athletics be-
cause of budgetary constraints.
(9) Owasso has plans to build an indoor practice facility for
baseball which will not adequately provide equal benefits
to girls softball.
(10) Owasso has constructed a high quality baseball stadium
complete with press box, scoreboard, dugouts, lights, sod
infield, sprinkler system, and bleachers. Although land is
available on campus, Owasso has refused to provide any
comparable girls' softball facility.
(11) The provision of medical and training facilities and serv-
ices are inequitable in that the male athletes have supe-
rior access to these facilities and services, while the
female athletes have very limited access to these facilities
and services.
(12) Owasso consistently provides less publicity for its female
athletic teams than for its male athletic teams. Owasso
also provides substantially more support for the male
teams than the female teams in that the school band plays
at the male athletic contests but not at the female athletic
contests, and male athletics are advertised more aggres-
sively than female athletics.
59. The gross imbalance in the treatment of female and male
athletes at Owasso, as detailed above, demonstrates Owasso's inten-
tional and conscious failure to comply with Title IX.
60. Owasso's conduct has persisted despite the information
provided by and the requests made by Plaintiffs and despite the
mandates of the Regulations, particularly 34 C.F.R §§ 106.3(a) and
106.41 (d), and the Policy Interpretation.
61. Owasso's conduct violates 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., as in-
terpreted by 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.31 and 106.41 and the Policy Inter-
pretation thereof.
[Vol. 15:371
GENDER EQUITY IN ATHLETICS
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF: EQUAL PROTECTION
(CLASS ACTION AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS)
62. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate herein by this refer-
ence paragraphs 1 through 62 inclusive of this Complaint.
63. Defendants, by their (1) failure to provide equal athletic
opportunities for female students and (2) failure to provide female
athletes with the same treatment and benefits as the male athletes
(as detailed above), have purposely discriminated against female
students, including the daughters of the named Plaintiffs, on the
basis of gender, and have intentionally deprived them of their
rights to equal protection secured by the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution.
64. Defendant Johnson, as Superintendent of Schools at
Owasso, has consistently refused to sponsor additional participa-
tion opportunities for female athletes. For example, Mr. Johnson
has failed and refused to endorse girls' volleyball as an interscho-
lastic sport at Owasso, despite the requests of parents and students
that he do so. Mr. Johnson has failed and refused to remedy the
unequal treatment and benefits received by Owasso's female ath-
letes-despite the numerous complaints of the named Plaintiffs
and other parents and athletes. Therefore, Mr. Johnson's actions
constitute a knowing disregard for Plaintiffs' daughters' constitu-
tional rights.
65. Defendant Dossett, as Principal at Owasso High School,
has consistently refused to sponsor additional participation oppor-
tunities for female athletes. For example, Mr. Dossett has failed
and refused to endorse girls' volleyball as an interscholastic sport at
Owasso, despite the requests of parents and students that he do so.
Mr. Dossett has also failed and refused to remedy the unequal
treatment and benefits received by Owasso's female athletes-de-
spite the numerous complaints of the named Plaintiffs and other
parents and athletes. Therefore, Mr. Dossett's actions constitute a
knowing disregard for Plaintiffs' daughters' constitutional rights.
66. Defendant Scott, as Athletic Director at Owasso High
School, has failed and refused to sponsor additional participation
opportunities for female athletes. For example, Mr. Scott has
failed and refused to endorse girls' volleyball as an interscholastic
sport at Owasso, despite the requests of parents and students that
he do so. Mr. Scott has also failed and refused to remedy the une-
qual treatment and benefits received by Owasso's female athletes-
despite the numerous complaints of the named Plaintiffs and other
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parents and athletes. Therefore, Mr. Scott's actions constitute a
knowing disregard for Plaintiffs' daughters' constitutional rights.
67. Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code pro-
vides, in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regula-
tion, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress....
68. When Defendants engaged in the improper actions de-
scribed above, they were acting under color of law for purposes of
the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution and
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under this section, each of the individual De-
fendants is liable on an individual basis for his violation of the
Plaintiffs' daughters' constitutional rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
RELIEF REQUESTED
WHEREFORE, on each of their claims, Plaintiffs respectfully
pray that this Court:
A. Certify this action as a class action for declaratory and in-
junctive relief on behalf of all present and future female
students at Owasso who participate, seek to participate, or
are deterred from participating in interscholastic and/or
other school-sponsored athletics at Owasso.
B. Enter an order declaring that Defendants have engaged in
a past and continuing pattern and practice of discrimina-
tion against female students on the basis of gender in viola-
tion of Title IX and the regulations promulgated thereun-
der (including both unequal participation opportunities
and unequal treatment and benefits), and the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Unit-
ed States Constitution.
[Vol. 15:371
GENDER EQUITY IN ATHLETICS
C. Issue a permanent injunction (a) restraining Defendants
and their officers, agents, employees, successors, and any
other persons acting in concert with them, from continuing
to maintain practices and policies of discrimination against
female students on the basis of gender, and (b) requiring
Defendants, immediately upon issuance of the injunctive
order, to adopt and implement a budget and plan which
corrects and remediates Defendants' violation of Title IX
and the Fourteenth Amendment. Such a plan should in-
clude, among other things, (1) allowing female students
the equal opportunity to participate in interscholastic and
other school-sponsored athletics, including a girls' volley-
ball team for the 1996 fall season and (2) providing female
athletes with treatment and benefits comparable to those
provided to male athletes.
D. Grant an expedited hearing and ruling on the permanent
injunction requested in C above.
E. Award the named Plaintiffs monetary relief as permitted by
Title IX, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and other applicable law, includ-
ing but not limited to, (1) the actual out-of-pocket costs in-
curred in paying for equipment and supplies for their
daughters to participate in interscholastic and other school-
sponsored athletics which would not be incurred by parents
of boys similarly situated, (2) the damages associated with
their daughters' lost opportunities to play interscholastic
and other school-sponsored athletics, (3) the damages asso-
ciated with their daughters' reduced opportunities to ob-
tain college athletic scholarships, and (4) the emotional
distress and other damages resulting from their being sub-
jected to unequal treatment and benefits in athletics on the
basis of gender.
F. Award Plaintiffs their reasonable attorneys' fees and costs
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
G. Order such other and further relief as the Court deems
appropriate.
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H. Designate that the trial take place before the U.S. District
Court in Tulsa, Oklahoma.
Dated:
NICHOLS, NICHOLS & KENNEDY
BY:
SAMUEL J. SCHILLER, OBA #016067




PROFESSOR RAY YASSER, OBA #009944
University of Tulsa College of Law
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National Women's Law Center
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V. THE END OF THE BEGINNING
Although this Article ends with the filing of the complaints,
the beginning of the struggle for gender equity in interscholastic
athletics in Oklahoma has really just begun. The ultimate outcome
of our litigation has yet to be decided, but we are confident that
the groundwork is laid for significant reform. In a subsequent Arti-
cle, we will consider the structure subsequently built on this
foundation.
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